NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/1

Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

20 March 2017

Original: English

First session
Vienna, 2-12 May 2017

Implementation of the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Summary update to the reports submitted by Austria

1. Introduction

1. Pursuant to action 20 of the action plan on nuclear disarmament adopted at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and to underline the importance of transparency and confidence-building, Austria submits the present update to the reports for the meetings of the Preparatory Committee in 2013 (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/1) and 2014 (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/19), as well as for the 2015 Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2015/28). The report outlines the national activities carried out since 2015 to implement the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference.

2. Nuclear disarmament

Action 1 of the action plan on nuclear disarmament

2. Austria has continued to pursue a world without nuclear weapons, based firmly on the Treaty as the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime.

3. On the occasion of the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, in December 2014 (see NPT/CONF.2015/28), Austria issued a pledge in which it committed itself to vigorously pursuing efforts towards nuclear disarmament. This pledge was subsequently renamed the Humanitarian Pledge and has now been endorsed by more than 120 States.

4. At the 2015 Review Conference, on 28 April 2015, the Minister for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs of Austria, Sebastian Kurz, delivered a statement on behalf of 159 States that was dedicated to the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons.

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5. Later in 2015, Austria was among the initiators of four General Assembly resolutions relating to nuclear disarmament (70/33, 70/47, 70/48 and 70/50).

6. Throughout 2016, Austria actively engaged in the deliberations held in Geneva by the Open-ended Working Group taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, which was established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 70/33. Austria submitted in particular two working papers to the Group in its national capacity.

7. On 21 September 2016, the Minister for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs addressed the General Assembly and reiterated Austria's commitment to achieving a world without nuclear weapons by calling for and outlining a concrete path towards the elimination of all nuclear weapons worldwide.

8. Austria was among the initiators of General Assembly resolution 71/258 on taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, adopted on 23 December 2016 by a large majority of the States Members of the United Nations. Pursuant to the resolution, negotiations within the framework of the United Nations for an instrument prohibiting nuclear weapons, leading to their total elimination, are scheduled to take place in New York from 27 to 31 March and from 15 June to 7 July 2017. The legal instrument under negotiation aims to contribute to the implementation of article VI of the Treaty, thereby strengthening the Treaty as a whole. In the course of the seventy-first session of the General Assembly, Austria has also supported other initiatives relating to nuclear disarmament, such as resolution 71/259 on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Actions 6, 7 and 9

9. Austria, as a member State of the Conference on Disarmament, has continued to support efforts to revitalize that forum.

Actions 12 to 14

10. Austria has continued to use all occasions, whether in bilateral or multilateral forums, to promote the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by States that have not yet done so, with a view to its early entry into force. The former Secretary-General for Foreign Affairs of Austria, Johannes Kyrle, has continued to work actively as a member of the Group of Eminent Persons of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, assisting with outreach efforts to bring about the entry into force of the Treaty. Austria has also continued to participate in the funding of the organization's certified radionuclide laboratory in Seibersdorf. The Ministry of Defence of Austria has continued to provide in-kind support to the organization free of charge (through training sites, equipment and personnel).

Action 19

11. Austria has continued to support the Office for Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations, in particular through substantial financial assistance to its branch office established in Vienna in 2012.

Action 22

12. Austria has continued to support education efforts aimed at disarmament and non-proliferation, primarily by supporting the Vienna Centre for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation,[1] which was established in 2011 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Austria and the James Martin Centre for Non-Proliferation Studies. The Centre engages in a broad range of activities, such as lectures, seminars and publications, thereby benefitting the international dialogue on disarmament and non-proliferation issues taking place in Vienna and elsewhere.

3. Non-proliferation

Action 23

13. Austria has continued to stress the Treaty's role as the cornerstone of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Accordingly, Austria promotes actively the universalization of the Treaty, both in its national capacity and by contributing to the design and implementation of relevant policies of the European Union.

Actions 24 to 29

14. Austria is among the States that have both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency in force, which represents the current verification standard of the Agency. Austria is also among the States for which the Agency has drawn the broader conclusion that all nuclear material in the country remains used for peaceful activities, and for which integrated safeguards are being implemented.

Actions 35 to 39

15. With a view to ensuring that nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly contribute to the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, Austria has been applying the understandings of the Zangger Committee and the guidelines developed by the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

16. With a view to halting the proliferation of ballistic missiles, which could be used as a means of delivery for nuclear warheads, Austria has been applying the export control guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime and has implemented the transparency and confidence-building measures enshrined in the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, for which Austria has continued to function as the executive secretariat and Immediate Central Contact.

Actions 40 to 46

17. Austria has adhered to all legal instruments regarding physical protection and the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism and has incorporated their principles and provisions into its national legislation and implemented them.

[1] www.vcdnp.org.

4. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

Action 47

18. Like other States, Austria exercises the inalienable right under article IV of the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with articles I, II and III, while respecting the corresponding rights of other States. This right entails the option not to use nuclear power, without, however, the outright renunciation of the right recognized in the Treaty to do so. Austria continues to hold the view that nuclear power can never be 100 per cent safe and that, given the long-term effects of nuclear accidents and the responsibilities attached to the nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear power does not contribute to sustainable development. Given the combination of safety, security and proliferation concerns, nuclear power is, likewise, not a viable avenue to confront global challenges such as climate change. Consequently, the Federal Constitutional Act for a Non-Nuclear Austria of 1999 prohibits, inter alia, the use of nuclear fission for the generation of power in Austria.

Actions 48 to 58

19. Austria views the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency as central in guaranteeing that countries exercise their right under article IV of the Treaty in accordance with the best safety, security and non-proliferation standards. Austria has therefore continued to support the Agency in this regard, inter alia, by paying its assessed contributions to the Agency and its share to the Agency's Technical Cooperation Fund in full and on time, and by supporting the creation and maintenance of the Agency's infrastructure.

Actions 59 to 64

20. Austria reaffirms the importance of ongoing international efforts to improve the global nuclear safety regime, including the robust implementation of the Agency's Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, and notes the central role of the Agency in the sharing and application of the lessons learned from the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station. Furthermore, Austria emphasizes the importance for all States, in particular those with nuclear fuel cycle activities, to become party to all conventions and agreements relevant to safety and security and to support the further development, as necessary, of legally binding instruments to ensure a better global safety and security framework. Austria is party to all conventions in the area of nuclear safety, and an active participant in corresponding review processes. Austria also has a strong civil nuclear liability regime in place.

21. Austria is eliminating highly enriched uranium in national civilian stocks and in use. Together with Norway, Austria held the second International Symposium on the Minimization of Highly Enriched Uranium in Vienna, in 2012, and reported on it in working paper NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.1. There were a number of policy ideas and recommendations that the symposium co-hosts, Austria, Norway and the Nuclear Threat Initiative, identified as a possible policy agenda for the future. Those ideas and recommendations are aimed at promoting tangible progress, as well as a culture of transparency, trust and cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy that ensures the highest level of safety, security and non-proliferation. They concern the minimization of highly enriched uranium, civilian naval propulsion reactors and transparency, and a few of them concern the expansion of efforts in those fields.

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Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Distr.: General
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First session
Vienna, 2-12 May 2017

Declaration of the member States of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean on the fiftieth anniversary of the conclusion of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

Submission by the secretariat of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean

On 14 February 2017, the States of Latin America and the Caribbean, all of them parties to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), represented by their ministers for foreign affairs, met in Mexico City at the twenty-fifth session of the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and issued a declaration on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the conclusion of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

The official English and Spanish versions of the declaration can be found at www.opanal.org/en/declaration-50th-anniversary-of-the-treaty-of-tlatelolco and www.opanal.org/declaracion-50-aniversario-del-tratado-de-tlatelolco.

Translations into the other official languages of the United Nations can be found at www.iaea.org/publications/documents/infcircs/communication-of-23-february-2017-from-the-permanent-mission-of-guatemala-concerning-the-declaration-by-the-member-states-of-opanal-on-the-50th-anniversary-of-the-conclusion-of-the-treaty-of-tlatelolco.

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Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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23 March 2017

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First session
Vienna, 2-12 May 2017

Implementation of the action plan agreed at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Report submitted by Poland

Pursuant to the request of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and in line with action 20 of the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted at the 2010 Review Conference, Poland submits its report, which outlines the steps and measures undertaken to implement all the provisions of the Treaty. The present report updates the information provided in Poland's report to the 2015 Review Conference. It has been structured according to the reporting template in the working document of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative on transparency by non-nuclear-weapon States parties submitted at the 2015 Review Conference.

Action number[2]	*Action*	*Measures taken*
Nuclear disarmament		
1	Summary of national policy on nuclear disarmament, including any relevant initiatives and actions that serve to illustrate the policy. Membership in regional and/or multilateral groups that promote nuclear disarmament.	Poland strongly encourages all nuclear-weapon States to continue, in good faith, their efforts aimed at achieving the long-term objective of eliminating nuclear weapons. Poland welcomes the ongoing implementation of New START and calls upon the Russian Federation and the United States of America to engage in a new round of negotiations and advance further steps in line with the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency. In this respect, Poland has been supportive of the inclusion of

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Action number[a]	*Action*	*Measures taken*
		non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe in general arms control and disarmament processes with a view to their gradual reduction and elimination. Since 2010, Poland has taken an active part in the work of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative. The main goal of the Initiative is to take forward the consensus outcomes of the 2010 Review Conference and jointly advance the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation agendas as mutually reinforcing processes. The Initiative submitted a number of working papers during the 2015 Review Conference cycle, calling for concrete steps towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. The papers refer to such issues as the reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in national security strategies, the inclusion of non-strategic nuclear weapons in any future nuclear disarmament process and the reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear arsenals.
2	National policy on irreversibility, verifiability and transparency, including any relevant initiatives and actions that serve to illustrate the policy. Support for relevant General Assembly resolutions that support irreversibility, verifiability and transparency.	Poland attaches the utmost importance to the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the implementation of its treaty obligations. Together with the member States of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, Poland has been promoting, in particular, the issue of transparency in nuclear disarmament. To this end, the Initiative submitted a working paper on nuclear-weapon States that included a draft reporting template for nuclear-weapon States. This was complemented by a working paper on transparency by non-nuclear-weapon States to the 2015 Review Conference, which included a draft reporting template for non-nuclear-weapon States. Poland is using the above-mentioned template to report to the 2020 Non-Proliferation Treaty review cycle. The issue of transparency was brought to the attention of nuclear-weapon States on numerous occasions, including during the

Action number[a]	Action	Measures taken
		meetings with the five permanent members of the Security Council in September 2016, and will be raised again during the planned encounters of the Initiative with the five permanent members in 2017. In March 2015, Poland joined the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification. Future nuclear disarmament agreements will require high-level expertise, which is necessary to fulfil all the commitments related to the total dismantlement of nuclear weapons. Poland has been a Co-Chair of one of the working groups of the Partnership.
6	Support for the establishment of a subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament to deal with nuclear disarmament, including through support for relevant draft Conference programmes of work, Non-Proliferation Treaty working papers and/or General Assembly resolutions. Participation in any working groups on nuclear disarmament.	Poland supports the establishment of a subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament to deal with nuclear disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work. We have worked actively and constructively to reach consensus on this matter, in particular during the Presidency of Poland in the Conference, notably by submitting, on 28 June 2016, a document with the proposed programme of work.
7	Support for the establishment of a subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament to discuss effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, including through support for relevant draft Conference programmes of work, Non-Proliferation Treaty working papers and/or General Assembly resolutions.	Poland supports the discussion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work. In our view, such a discussion should be comprehensive and include an assessment of the implementation of and compliance with existing negative security assurances. Poland is a member of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, which produced a working paper entitled "Nuclear-weapon-free zones and negative security assurances" for the Preparatory Committee for the 2013 Review Conference. That paper stressed the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in receiving unequivocal and legally binding security assurances.
9	(For all States)	Poland supports the development and

Action number[a]	Action	Measures taken
	National efforts to support the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties.	establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones freely arrived at in accordance with the universally agreed principle mentioned in the relevant guidelines agreed by the Disarmament Commission.
	Support for relevant General Assembly resolutions and/or Non-Proliferation Treaty working papers that support the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.	Poland was in favour of all General Assembly resolutions on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions concerned (most recently, resolutions 71/26, 71/29, 71/43, 71/51 and 71/65).
	Name of the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty to which your country is party.	As part of the European Union, Poland has supported all efforts (such as workshops and seminars) aimed at facilitating a conference on the weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in the Middle East.
11	Date of signature and ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.	Poland signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty on 24 September 1996 and ratified it on 25 May 1999.
	Current status of the reporting State's policy on the moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions.	Poland supports maintaining the moratorium on nuclear test explosions.
12	Confirmation that the commitment was met to report to the 2011 Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (Article XIV Conference) on progress made towards the urgent entry into force of that Treaty.	As a member State of the European Union, Poland has contributed to the European Union reports on the progress made towards the urgent entry into force of the Treaty.
	Summary of reports made at the subsequent Article XIV Conferences on progress made towards the entry into force of the Treaty.	
13	Activities to promote the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty at the national, regional and global levels, in particular a summary of efforts to encourage all States that have yet to do so to sign and ratify the Treaty (for example, positions on General Assembly resolutions; participation in Article XIV Conferences or ministerial meetings in support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; participation in Non-Proliferation Treaty working papers and/or national, regional and multilateral activities).	As a member State of the European Union, Poland has supported all relevant European Union statements, positions, initiatives and financial contributions aimed at facilitating the entry into force of the Treaty, in particular Council of the European Union decision 2015/1837 of 12 October 2015 on European Union support for the activities of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in order to strengthen its monitoring and verification capabilities and in the framework of the implementation of the European Union

Action number[a]	*Action*	*Measures taken*
	Summary of national efforts to fully implement the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (for example, national legislation or policies). List any nationals who participate in the Group of Eminent Persons of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.	Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland participated in the eighth ministerial meeting of the Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in September 2016. During the 2015 Non-Proliferation Treaty review cycle, Poland, together with its Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative partners, submitted a working document on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Poland also supported the most recent General Assembly resolution on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, resolution 71/86.
14	Summary of national efforts to construct, complete and/or certify International Monitoring System stations. Summary of national efforts to help the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization strengthen its verification regime (for example, workshops, seminars, training, exercises, voluntary funding contributions and/or in-kind contributions). Summary of national efforts to help develop the Organization's on-site inspection capabilities.	Poland does not host any International Monitoring System stations. However, Poland is committed to strengthening the verification regime of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. We undertook internal efforts to mobilize a group of national experts that can support the work of the Organization.
15	Support for launching negotiations on a treaty to ban the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, including through support for relevant draft Conference on Disarmament programmes of work, General Assembly resolutions and/or Non-Proliferation Treaty working papers. Summary of contributions to the Group of Governmental Experts on the subject.	Poland supports the launch of negotiations on a treaty to ban the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. This was reflected by voting in favour of General Assembly resolution 71/259, which, inter alia, called for the establishment of a high-level fissile material cut-off treaty expert preparatory group to make recommendations on substantial elements of a future fissile material cut-off treaty. Poland was asked to nominate its representative to take part in the above-mentioned group.
17	Information on the status of the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements to ensure the irreversible removal of excess fissile material.	Poland, together with the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, submitted a working paper to the 2013 Preparatory Committee entitled "Wider application of safeguards in the

Action number[a]	*Action*	*Measures taken*
	Proposals and/or statements made in support of the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements to ensure the irreversible removal of excess fissile material from military stockpiles by nuclear-weapon States.	nuclear-weapon States", which included a recommendation to nuclear-weapon States to consider placing "excess" nuclear material under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verification in such a manner as to make it irreversible. The Initiative's working paper submitted to the 2015 Review Conference also covered that issue.
18	Information on any current or future plans to dismantle or convert to peaceful uses facilities that produce fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes. Confirmation that domestic nuclear facilities do not produce fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.	Poland has never had facilities for the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. None of the Polish domestic facilities produce or are suitable for producing fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
19	Any cooperation among Governments, the United Nations and civil society aimed at increasing confidence, improving transparency and developing efficient verification capabilities related to nuclear disarmament. Summary of national, regional and international efforts to promote greater transparency, confidence and efficiency in the verification of nuclear disarmament.	Poland, together with members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, presented a working paper entitled "Increased transparency in nuclear disarmament" to the 2014 Preparatory Committee. The paper encouraged nuclear-weapon States to agree on a standard reporting form to meet their disarmament reporting obligations. Nuclear-weapon State transparency was also covered in an Initiative working paper that was submitted to the 2015 Review Conference. Since 2015, Poland has been a member of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification and contributes to its work by chairing one of the working groups.
20	Year and official document symbol of regular reports on the implementation of article VI, paragraph 4 (c), of the 1995 decision entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" and the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.	Poland has been regularly reporting on its activities to implement its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty to each Review Conference. The previous report was submitted in 2015 (NPT/CONF.2015/25).
21	Summary of efforts to encourage the nuclear-weapon States to agree on a standard reporting form and an appropriate reporting interval.	Together with the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, Poland has been encouraging the nuclear-weapon States to agree on a standard reporting form. This issue was raised during regular meetings of the

Action number[a]	*Action*	*Measures taken*
		Initiative with the five permanent members of the Security Council, as well as in the statements of the Initiative and Poland that were delivered during the 2015 Non-Proliferation Treaty review cycle.
22	Summary of efforts to promote education on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation (for example, contributions to the report of the Secretary-General, adding the subject to school curricula, seminars, conferences, exhibitions, partnerships with civil society, public events, social media events and contests).	Poland, with the support of other countries and the Office for Disarmament Affairs, organized a side event entitled "United Nations Study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education — What's Next?", which took place on 3 October 2016 at the margins of the First Committee. The purpose of the side event was to bring together the co-authors of the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education, as well as other stakeholders, with the aim of looking back at what has been achieved since 2002 and taking a new fresh look at the future of disarmament and non-proliferation education in the digital age.
Nuclear non-proliferation		
23	Summary of efforts to promote universal adherence to the Treaty.	Poland, during bilateral talks with countries that are not parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, has been regularly calling upon those countries to join the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. These calls were also made in statements delivered in relevant multilateral forums.
24	Summary of safeguards agreements concluded with IAEA, such as a comprehensive safeguards agreement, additional protocols and/or modified small quantities protocols.	Poland ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty on 12 June 1969, and it came into force on 5 May 1970. The comprehensive safeguards agreement between Poland and IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty entered into force on 11 October 1972. The requirements of article III, paragraph 1, were therefore fulfilled with regard to Poland. Moreover, in order to ensure the highest possible level of transparency, the additional protocol to the agreement between Poland and IAEA was ratified on 5 May 2000. Poland continuously supports strengthening IAEA and European Atomic Energy Community

Action number[a]	*Action*	*Measures taken*
		(Euratom) safeguards systems and believes that the agreement between Poland, Euratom and IAEA, as well as the additional protocol thereto, represents the highest current verification standards for safeguards and non-proliferation.
25	Summary of efforts to conclude or implement a comprehensive safeguards agreement, or to facilitate and encourage others to do so.	Poland has been consistently encouraging States that have not yet done so to conclude or implement comprehensive safeguards agreements, together with additional protocols. Poland considers such agreements and protocols tc represent the current verification standard.
26	Summary of national efforts to comply with non-proliferation obligations. Examples of initiatives, including through Non-Proliferation Treaty working papers, that promote high international standards of compliance. Summary of IAEA conclusions on the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.	Poland remains unequivocally committed to its obligation under article II of the Treaty, namely, not to transfer, manufacture or receive control over nuclear weapons. The trade, import, export, acquisition, brokering or transport of weapons of mass destruction, whether nuclear, chemical or biological weapons or their components, through the territory of Poland are explicitly prohibited under Polish law. In this respect, the Atomic Law of November 2000, with subsequent amendments (including a major amendment in 2011), and the Law on Foreign Trade in Goods, Technologies and Services of Strategic Importance to the Security of the State and to Maintaining International Peace and Security, of 29 November 2000, as amended in July 2004, deserve a mention. In addition, the Polish Criminal Code provides for criminal sanctions against any person who, in violation of international law, produces, stockpiles, acquires, sells or transports weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear weapons) or other means of combat, or conducts research aimed at producing or using such weapons. IAEA confirms compliance by Poland with its non-proliferation obligations. The most recent safeguards conclusion that all nuclear material has remained in peaceful activities in Poland is based on the Agency's finding that there are no indications of diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear

Action number[a]	*Action*	*Measures taken*
		activities and no indications of undeclared nuclear material or activities in Poland as a whole.
27	Summary of national steps taken to address cases of non-compliance with non-proliferation obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including the implementation of sanctions regimes imposed by the Security Council or statements in relevant international forums, such as the General Conference or the Board of Governors of IAEA.	Poland abides by the highest standards of compliance with its non-proliferation commitments and obligations, and cooperates fully with IAEA. Poland calls upon all States to cooperate fully with IAEA and to comply with their international safeguards obligations. In January 2017, Poland provided an extrabudgetary contribution for IAEA to carry out verification activities in support of the joint plan of action of the five plus one group and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Poland condemned two nuclear tests conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 2016 by both issuing national statements and supporting declarations made as part of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative. Poland submitted information on the measures it had undertaken in order to implement the provisions of Security Council resolution 2321 (2016).
28	Date of signature and entry into force of an additional protocol to an agreement with IAEA. Summary of efforts to implement the additional protocol or to encourage and enable others to do so.	The agreement between Poland and IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty entered into force on 11 October 1972. The requirements of article III, paragraph 1, were therefore fulfilled with regard to Poland. Moreover, in order to ensure the highest possible level of transparency, the additional protocol to the agreement between Poland and IAEA was ratified on 5 May 2000. Poland continuously supports the strengthening of IAEA and Euratom safeguards systems and believes that the agreement between Poland, Euratom and IAEA and the additional protocol represent the current verification standard for safeguards and non-proliferation.
29	Summary of national, regional and/or multilateral efforts to promote or assist other States in concluding or implementing a comprehensive safeguards agreement.	Not available.

Action number[a]	*Action*	*Measures taken*
30	Summary of support for efforts to apply safeguards more widely in nuclear-weapon States (for example, Non-Proliferation Treaty working papers).	The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative presented a working paper entitled "Wider application of safeguards in the nuclear-weapons States" to the 2013 Preparatory Committee.
31	Efforts to amend or rescind an existing small quantities protocol.	Poland has never had a small quantities protocol.
32	Summary of efforts to review and evaluate IAEA safeguards.	Not available.
33	Summary of the status of payment of assessed contributions to IAEA. Summary of extrabudgetary, voluntary and/or in-kind contributions to IAEA.	Poland regularly pays its assessed contributions to IAEA. The payment covers a contribution to the regular budget and to the Technical Cooperation Fund. In 2016 Poland contributed €20,000 to IAEA for the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles. In January 2017, Poland provided an extrabudgetary contribution of €30.000 for IAEA to carry out verification activities in support of the joint plan of action of the five plus one group and the Islamic Republic of Iran.
34	Summary of contributions to the development of an international technology base to help improve IAEA safeguards.	Not available.
35	Summary of efforts in export control regimes (for example, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee and the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies) and other arrangements (for example, domestic legislation or bilateral agreements) that help to ensure that nuclear-related exports do not lead to proliferation.	As a member of both the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee, Poland implements its obligations under article III, paragraph 2 of the Treaty by controlling its exports in accordance with the provisions of the article, according to which each State party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material; or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material is subject to the safeguards required by the article. Poland also cooperates in the framework of the information exchange system aimed at providing the States members of the

Action number[a]	Action	Measures taken
		Nuclear Suppliers Group with national control system refusals regarding dual-use products. Polish responsibilities under article III, paragraph 2, are also fulfilled through participation in the European Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items. Poland participates in the Missile Technology Control Regime and implements its guidelines, which restrict the proliferation of the means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. Poland continues to strengthen its borders against the possible illicit transfer of vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials.
36	Summary of the implementation of nuclear export control lists in domestic export control legislation and/or regulations.	Poland pays special attention to the nuclear export control of strategic and dual-use items. The administrative requirements related to nuclear exports are precisely described in regulations adopted in 2012 (Notice of the Marshal of the Sejm of Poland of 27 November 2012 on the publication of the consolidated text of the Act on foreign trade in goods, technologies and services of strategic importance to the security of the State and to maintaining international peace and security). Poland applies the legislation of the European Union which is based on IAEA information circulars 254/Part 1 and Part 2.
37	Summary of efforts to show that the compliance record of a recipient State is taken into account in making nuclear export decisions.	Decisions on nuclear export to any country are based on the status of the safeguards agreement between IAEA and a recipient State.
38	Support for the legitimate right of States to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, such as by providing a list of developing States with which nuclear cooperation agreements have been completed.	Poland is not a significant exporter of nuclear technology or nuclear material. Poland does not have agreements in the field of the peaceful use of nuclear energy and technology with developing countries. For other nuclear cooperation agreements concluded by Poland, please see action 51.

Action number[a]	*Action*	*Measures taken*
39	Summary of the key policy criteria considered when determining whether to engage in nuclear cooperation with a State. Efforts to facilitate international cooperation and the transfer of nuclear technology.	Two different policy criteria are considered when determining whether to engage in nuclear cooperation with a State, both of which are crucial. The first criterion is a high level of nuclear expertise and state of nuclear power development in the State that would make nuclear cooperation attractive to Poland in various aspects of the Polish nuclear power programme, such as industry involvement, human resources development and radioactive waste management. The second criterion is to be a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and comply with all relevant international obligations under the Treaty.
40	Summary of efforts to strengthen the physical protection of nuclear facilities, in particular by the national regulatory agency. Summary of efforts undertaken to implement commitments made as part of the Nuclear Security Summit process.	Nuclear safety and security issues are of utmost importance for Poland, which is a party to all the multilateral legal instruments created under the auspices of IAEA. Poland considers the conversion of the Maria reactor between 2012 and 2014 as a crucial project, which substantially contributed to enhancing nuclear security. Poland has also actively participated in the process aimed at amending the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and ratified its amendment on 1 June 2007. The IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service mission was conducted in Poland in 2016. Poland has also announced to IAEA its willingness to provide experts to IAEA Advisory Service missions. The International Nuclear Emergency Exercise tabletop exercise was held in Poland in 2016. The Exercise has been organized by the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development since 1993. It is an effective tool for testing and improving the ability to respond to domestic and international radiation emergencies. Poland has been an active participant in the Nuclear Security Summit process since the first meeting in Washington,

Action number[a]	*Action*	*Measures taken*
		D.C., in 2010. Poland has taken concrete steps to minimize the threat of nuclear terrorism and to strengthen the chain of nuclear security. Detailed information on the subject has been provided through the Nuclear Security National Progress Report, submitted during the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C., in 2016.
41	Summary of efforts to apply the IAEA recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected)). Timeline for any national reviews of physical protection policies and practices that have been planned or accomplished.	Poland actively participates in IAEA activities related to the preparation or revision of the publication of the Nuclear Security Series. Between 2017 and 2020, the preparation and implementation of the action plan focused on addressing the 2016 mission findings of the International Physical Protection Advisory Service are planned. Action will include a review of the existing legal framework and the identification of amendments necessary to ensure full compliance with the latest international recommendations and good practices, with due consideration to IAEA Nuclear Security Series documents, including the Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5).
42	Summary of progress in signing, ratifying and implementing the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Summary of efforts to promote the ratification and implementation of the amended Convention.	Poland ratified the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material on 1 June 2007.
43	Summary of steps taken to implement the principles of the revised IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. Summary of steps taken to implement the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.	Poland has implemented the principles of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources. Poland has established an effective national legislative and regulatory system of control over the management and protection of radioactive sources. The system has been successively improved in accordance with international recommendations and achievements in this field.

Action number[a]	*Action*	*Measures taken*
44	Summary of efforts to strengthen national capabilities against the illicit trafficking of nuclear material. Summary of efforts to provide assistance to other States to strengthen national capabilities against illicit trafficking of nuclear material (for example, the Nuclear Security Summit and the G-8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction). Information about participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative. Information about participation in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Summary of any reports provided in accordance with Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). Status of participation in the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database.	Poland maintains a complex radiometric control system at the country's borders. Because of the fact that Poland is geographically located at the intersection of main transit routes, it plays an important role in preventing illicit trafficking. In recent years, the radiometric control system has been modernized thanks to the cooperation between Poland and the United States in the framework of the Second Line of Defense Programme. In the event of an incident involving nuclear or other radioactive material or data being obtained from the detection system, a special report is submitted to the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database. Poland has provided reports to the Database from the very beginning of its existence. Poland has also taken concrete actions with respect to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons by non-State actors. We promote effective practices that implement Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and actively participate in the Proliferation Security Initiative (Poland hosted the high-level political meeting in 2013). Poland is also involved in the work of the Group of Eight Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. In 2016, Poland finalized the review of national regulations concerning non-proliferation. The result is the national interdiction mechanism, which is the decision matrix in the event of the need to interdict the shipment of weapons of mass destruction. The main goal of the comprehensive review was to ensure that Polish authorities are well prepared to stop, first and foremost, non-State actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. Poland is also a member of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. In January 2017, the Polish delegation actively participated in the Vigilant Marmot workshop organized under the Initiative. The workshop was focused on

Action number[a]	*Action*	*Measures taken*
		addressing challenges in adopting or updating national legal frameworks to effectively prosecute nuclear terrorism offences and to fulfil obligations under international legal instruments against radiological and nuclear terrorism. Poland has participated in all Nuclear Security Summits. Since 2016, we have been also a member of the Nuclear Security Contact Group, which facilitates the cooperation of interested countries in the field of nuclear security.
45	Summary of progress in signing, ratifying and implementing the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.	Poland ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism on 8 April 2010.
46	Summary of efforts to establish and maintain a State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material. Summary of cooperation with IAEA on the accounting and control of nuclear materials.	Poland fully cooperates with IAEA and Euratom in their safeguards verification activities carried out in connection with nuclear facilities and nuclear material present in Poland. The first approach to the establishment of a State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material was taken at the beginning of 1970s when the comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA entered into force. Since then, strengthening measures have been applied to national regulatory controls of nuclear material. Currently, IAEA carries out the following types of inspections: interim and physical inventory verification and unannounced and short-notice random inspection. Based on its own criteria and decisions and the arrangement agreed between Poland and IAEA, the Agency carries out complementary access visits.
Peaceful uses of nuclear energy		
47	Summary of the types of peaceful uses of nuclear energy being pursued nationally (for example, power generation, mining, medical uses and agricultural uses).	There are currently no nuclear power plants in Poland. One research reactor, Maria (with a total capacity of 30 MW), is located at the National Centre for Nuclear Research in Świerk, near Warsaw. The reactor is one of the leading producers of medical radioisotopes (molybdenum-99) in the world. The

Action number[a]	*Action*	*Measures taken*
		National Centre for Nuclear Research is also a producer of, inter alia, various types of nuclear accelerators. As in most developed countries, nuclear technologies are used in Poland in the medical sector (for example, hospitals) and for various types of industrial applications (for example, material checks, food sterilizations and environmental protection).
48	Summary of the national policy on nuclear cooperation.	Poland, as a country that is preparing to develop a nuclear power programme, relies to a large extent on the experience of countries with developed nuclear power programmes. The exchange of experience and other cooperation in some cases is executed on the basis of the memorandums of cooperation that the former Minister of Economy signed with counterparts in Japan, the Republic of Korea and the United States. Poland intends to sign a similar memorandum with China in April 2017. Plans are also under way to sign memorandums with Canada and Finland. The bilateral cooperation takes the form of study visits, conferences, seminars and fellowships. Poland is also developing cooperation within the scope of national industry involvement, mainly through the organization of trade missions abroad.
49	Summary of national, regional and/or multilateral efforts to assist developing States through the IAEA technical cooperation programme.	As a non-nuclear-energy country, with an insufficient level of nuclear expertise, Poland is not engaged in such activities.
50	Summary of the types of nuclear cooperation undertaken nationally, in particular in developing States (for example, natural resources, medical, agricultural, power generation, safety and security and technical training).	See action 49 above.

Action number[a]	*Action*	*Measures taken*
51	List of the total number of nuclear cooperation agreements in place or awaiting implementation.	Nuclear cooperation agreements in place: 3 (with Japan, the Republic of Korea and the United States).
	List of the total number of countries with which nuclear cooperation agreements are in effect (see actions 37 and 38).	Nuclear cooperation agreements awaiting adoption: 1 with China (signing planned in the first half of 2017).
52	Summary of any voluntary or in-kind contributions made to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund.	In 2016, Poland did not make voluntary or in-kind contributions to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund. Poland national counterparts take part in managing the Fund through technical cooperation at the level of the Europe region. The planning of new technical cooperation cycles is strictly followed and supported by national counterparts through technical cooperation regional meetings of the national liaison officers.
	Summary of efforts to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, accountability and transparency of the Fund.	
53	Summary of efforts in the IAEA Board of Governors Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee.	Poland does not take part in the Board of Governors Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee.
	Summary of efforts to improve the design, implementation and oversight of the Technical Cooperation Fund.	
54	Summary of any national position on funding for the Technical Cooperation Fund.	In the past decade, Poland has transferred the full amount of its voluntary contribution to the Technical Cooperation Fund each year.
	Rate of attainment of assessed voluntary contributions to the Fund.	In 2016, Poland contributed €7,000 to IAEA as a country payment for the IAEA technical cooperation programme for Poland.
	Extrabudgetary contributions to IAEA for technical cooperation.	
55	Summary of any voluntary or in-kind contributions to the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative.	Not available.
56	Summary of efforts to provide technical training on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to other States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.	Polish institutions regularly host IAEA fellows from other member States. In 2016, eight IAEA fellows were hosted by Polish institutions from Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Jordan, Romania and the Syrian Arab Republic. The topics of the fellowships were medical applications, industry applications and research reactors.
		Poland organizes IAEA training courses and workshops in different technical areas. In 2016, two such events were hosted by Polish institutions: the IAEA

Action number[a]	*Action*	*Measures taken*
		technical meeting on enhancing the safety and control features of existing radiation processing facilities, held in Warsaw from 30 May to 3 June 2016, and the IAEA regional workshop on the assessment of regulatory competence needs for regulating nuclear safety (SARCoN seminars), held in Warsaw from 14 to 18 November 2016.
57	Title and date of key national legislation on nuclear energy. Date of ratification of a safeguards agreement with IAEA, as well as an additional protocol (see actions 24 and 28, as applicable). Title of legislation and regulations for nuclear energy. Confirmation of the application of IAEA safety standards and security guidance, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the Amendment thereto and/or the domestic application of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.	The comprehensive safeguards agreement between Poland and IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty entered into force on 11 October 1972. The additional protocol to the agreement between Poland and IAEA was ratified on 5 May 2000. Polish nuclear law requires that IAEA safety standards and security guidance be taken into account when national requirements are being established. The requirements of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material were incorporated into the national law even before the Amendment had entered into force. The Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources was incorporated into the domestic law through: • Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 20 February 2007 on the terms for import into the territory of Poland, export from the territory of Poland and transit through the territory of nuclear materials, radioactive sources and equipment containing such sources • Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 21 October 2008 on granting licences and permits to import into the territory of Poland, export from the territory of Poland and transit through the territory radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel • Atomic Law Act of 29 November 2000 with later amendments

Action number[a]	Action	Measures taken
		The Atomic Law Act is supplemented by over 40 implementing regulations, including: • Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 31 August 2012 on nuclear safety and the radiological protection requirements that must be fulfilled by a nuclear facility design • Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 11 February 2013 on requirements for the commissioning and operation of nuclear facilities • Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 27 December 2011 on periodical safety assessments of a nuclear facility • Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 20 February 2007 on the emergency plans for radiation emergencies • Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 4 November 2008 on physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities • Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 14 December 2015 on radioactive waste and spent fuel management
58	Summary of efforts to develop multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle.	In the context of the development of the Polish nuclear power programme, Poland is actively involved in the work of two international organizations related to the development of the nuclear fuel cycle: the International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation and the European Repository Development Organization. The International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation provides a forum for cooperation among participating States to explore mutually beneficial approaches to ensure that the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes proceeds in a manner that is efficient and meets the highest standards of safety, security and non-proliferation. The European Repository Development Organization is a European organization that aims to address the common challenges of safely managing the long-

Action number[a]	*Action*	*Measures taken*
		lived radioactive waste in member countries and facilitate collaboration on nuclear waste disposal.
59	Status with regard to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. Status with regard to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material could be reiterated (see actions 42 and 45).	Status with regard to the: • Convention on Nuclear Safety: party to the Convention, entry into force on 24 October 1996 • Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident: party to the Convention, entry into force on 24 April 1988 • Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency: party to the Convention, entry into force on 24 April 1988 • Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management: party to the Convention, entry into force on 18 June 2001 • International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism: party to the Convention, entry into force on 8 April 2010 • Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material: party to the Convention, ratification on 1 June 2007, entry into force on 8 May 2016
60	Summarize how international best practices on nuclear safety and security have been implemented nationally. Summarize any peer reviews conducted by the IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service and how its recommendations are being implemented. Summarize any contributions to the IAEA Nuclear Security Series. Summarize any contributions to or reviews by the IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service teams. Summarize any participation in or contributions to workshops by non-governmental organizations, such as the World Institute for Nuclear Security.	Poland hosted the IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service mission in 2013. The recommendations and suggestions received were analysed, and several actions were taken afterwards to answer the findings of the mission. The follow-up mission to verify the national implementation of the findings is envisaged in 2017. The National Atomic Energy Agency participates in the development of the IAEA safety standards for the peaceful use of nuclear energy through work in the Nuclear Safety Standards Committee, the Radiation Safety Standards Committee, the Waste Safety Standards Committee and the Transport Safety Standards Committee.

Action number[a]	*Action*	*Measures taken*
		The National Atomic Energy Agency's Office for Safeguards and Non-Proliferation contributes to the development of IAEA Nuclear Security Series publications and attends meetings of the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee. Poland hosted the International Physical Protection Advisory Service mission in 2016 and is implementing its recommendations and suggestions. The National Atomic Energy Agency contributes to the work of the Service by providing team members.
61	Summarize any national efforts to reduce the use of high-enriched uranium in civilian nuclear programmes and/or convert nuclear facilities to the use of low-enriched uranium. Summarize any international assistance provided to other States to reduce the use of high-enriched uranium in civilian nuclear programmes.	Under the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, between 2009 and 2016, Poland converted its research reactor from high-enriched uranium fuel to low-enriched uranium fuel. All the spent high-enriched uranium fuel was shipped to the Russian Federation. Only low-enriched nuclear fuel is left within the territory of Poland. See response to action 40. In addition, Poland plans to withdraw high-enriched uranium targets used for molybdenum production.
62	Summarize national regulations on the transport of radioactive materials, noting, in particular, the implementation of the updated IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials (No. SSR-6, 2012).	Poland has implemented the Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials (2012 edition, No. SSR-6). Poland established an effective national legislative and regulatory system of control over the management and protection of radioactive sources in the transport of dangerous goods belonging to Class 7. The system is successively improved in accordance with international recommendations and achievements in this field. Moreover, Poland has signed and implemented the international agreements according safe transport of dangerous goods, including the European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road, the Regulations concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Rail, the European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Inland Waterways and the agreements of the International Civil Aviation Organization.

Action number[a]	*Action*	*Measures taken*
63	List the date of signature and ratification of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and/or the Convention on Third-Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy. List the title and date of adoption of any national legislation on nuclear liability.	Status with regard to the: • Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage: not party to the Convention • Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage: party to the Convention, accession on 23 Jan 1990, entry into force on 23 Apr 1990 • 1988 Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention: party to the Convention, entry into force 27 Apr 1992 • Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage: ratification by Poland on 21 September 2010 • Convention on Third-Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy: not party to the Convention Title and date of adoption of any national legislation on nuclear liability: • Atomic Law Act of 29 November 2000 • Regulation by the Minister of Finance of 14 September 2011 on a guaranteed minimum amount of the compulsory civil liability insurance of the nuclear facility's operator
64	National position on attacks on or threats against safeguarded nuclear facilities for peaceful purposes.	Poland abides by the decision adopted by consensus at the General Conference of IAEA on 18 September 2009 on the prohibition of armed attack or threat of attack against nuclear installations, during operation or under construction.

[a] Actions 3, 4, 5, 8, 10 and 16 have been skipped because they are applicable only to nuclear-weapon States.

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Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons

Report submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to section IV, paragraph 9, of the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. By virtue of that section, the Conference reaffirmed that "all States parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States and the States in the region, should continue to report on steps taken to implement the 1995 Resolution". Accordingly, the present report contains the list of measures taken by the Islamic Republic of Iran since the 2010 Review Conference with regard to the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, including the 2010 action plan on the implementation of the 1995 resolution.

2. As the initiator of the idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, presented in 1974, a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and a signatory to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and having a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), based on which all of its nuclear facilities are under the Agency's safeguards, the Islamic Republic of Iran has a high record of accession, among the Middle Eastern countries, to the international instruments banning weapons of mass destruction. This, indeed, is a clear manifestation of the firm commitment of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the cause of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as the realization of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. It also testifies to the strong commitment of the Islamic Republic of Iran to achieving the objective of the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, use or threat of use of weapons of mass destruction.

3. Consistent with this policy, the Islamic Republic of Iran fully supports and underlines the importance of the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, which is an essential and integral element of the outcome of the 1995 Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty was indefinitely extended without a vote in 1995. While expressing deep concern over the long delay in the implementation of the resolution, the importance of which and the full realization of whose goals and objectives were

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reaffirmed by the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences, the Islamic Republic of Iran strongly believes that, as reaffirmed by those Review Conferences, the resolution remains valid until its goals and objectives are achieved.

4. The adoption of the 2010 action plan on the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, which called for the convening of a conference in 2012 on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, taking the 1995 resolution as its terms of reference, was a positive sign towards the implementation of the 1995 resolution. Since the adoption of that action plan, the Islamic Republic of Iran has fully supported its prompt and full implementation. The steps taken by the Islamic Republic of Iran concerning the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and the 2010 action plan on the implementation of that resolution are, among others, as follows:

I. The Islamic Republic of Iran continued to vote in favour of the General Assembly resolution on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East. In the resolution, which, since 1982, has been adopted annually by the Assembly without a vote, the Assembly, inter alia, "urges all parties directly concerned seriously to consider taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, and, as a means of promoting this objective, invites the countries concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons", "calls upon all countries of the region that have not yet done so, pending the establishment of the zone, to agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards", and "invites those countries, pending the establishment of the zone, not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or permit the stationing on their territories, or territories under their control, of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices".

II. Moreover, in line with its principled position on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the need for achieving the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to vote in favour of the General Assembly resolution on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, in which the Assembly, "recalling that Israel remains the only State in the Middle East that has not yet become a party to the Treaty" and expressing concern "about the threats posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons to the security and stability of the Middle East region", "reiterates that the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty remains valid until its goals and objectives are achieved", "calls for immediate steps towards the full implementation of that resolution", "reaffirms the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East" and calls upon Israel "to accede to the Treaty without further delay, not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons and to place all its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities under full-scope Agency safeguards as an important confidence-building measure among all States of the region and as a step towards enhancing peace and security".

III. The Islamic Republic of Iran also continued to vote in favour of the IAEA General Conference resolution on the application of IAEA safeguards in

the Middle East, by virtue of which the General Conference, by expressing concern over the "grave consequences, endangering peace and security, of the presence in the Middle East region of nuclear activities not wholly devoted to peaceful purposes", "calls upon all States in the region to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons", "affirms the urgent need for all States in the Middle East to forthwith accept the application of full-scope Agency safeguards to all their nuclear activities" as a step in enhancing peace and security in the context of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, and "calls upon all States of the region, pending the establishment of the zone, not to pursue actions that would undermine the goal of establishing the zone, including developing, producing, testing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons".

IV. Furthermore, the Islamic Republic of Iran continued its full support for the Organization of Islamic Cooperation resolution on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. In the resolution, the Organization, inter alia, expressing deep concern "that the possession of nuclear weapons by Israel poses grave dangers to the security and stability of the Middle East region", "constitutes a threat to non-nuclear-weapon States and poses grave danger to international peace and security" and recalling "that Israel is the only country in the Middle East that has yet to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons", "calls on Israel to accede to the Treaty, without further delay and unconditionally, and to place all its nuclear facilities under the comprehensive safeguards regime of IAEA" and "reaffirms the importance of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East as soon as possible to preserve peace and security in the region".

V. In addition, the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to vote in favour of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation resolution on condemnation of the Zionist regime for possession of nuclear capability to develop nuclear arsenals. By that resolution, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation expresses grave concern over "the statement made by the Prime Minister of Israel, in which he acknowledged publicly the possession of nuclear weapons by its regime" and "condemns in the strongest terms the possession of nuclear capability by the Israeli regime to develop nuclear arsenals". It further "expresses its grave concern over the clandestine nuclear activities and acquisition of nuclear weapon capability by Israel, which poses a serious and continuing threat to international peace and security, as well as the security of neighbouring and other States, and condemns it for continuing to develop and stockpile nuclear arsenals". Moreover, the Organization "urges the international community to exert pressure on Israel to renounce possession of its nuclear weapons, to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons without further delay and any conditions, to place promptly all its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards". The Organization also, once again, "reaffirms the need for the speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East".

VI. In the implementation of the General Assembly resolutions on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, in which the Assembly "invites all countries of the region, pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, to declare their support for establishing such a zone, consistent with paragraph 63 (d) of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and to deposit those declarations with the Security Council", on 28 January 2014, the Islamic Republic of Iran, in a letter to the Secretary-

General, reiterated its long-standing support for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East.

VII. The Islamic Republic of Iran also actively participated in the 2015 Review Conference and the meetings of its Preparatory Committee, and submitted four reports on the steps that it had taken with regard to the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and the 2010 action plan on its implementation.

VIII. As a member of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to support the common position of the Movement on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons, reflected in the Final Documents of the Summits and Ministerial Conferences of the Movement. The latest such documents are the Final Documents of the sixteenth and seventeenth Summits of the Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, held in Tehran, from 26 to 31 August 2012, and on Margarita Island, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, on 17 and 18 September 2016, respectively, through which the ministers, inter alia, "reaffirmed the need for the speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East", "called upon all parties concerned to take urgent and practical steps towards the fulfilment of the proposal initiated by Iran in 1974 for the establishment of such a zone" and "pending its establishment... demanded that Israel, the only country in the region that has not joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons nor declared its intention to do so, renounce possession of nuclear weapons, accede to the Treaty without precondition and further delay, place promptly all its nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards according to Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and conduct its nuclear-related activities in conformity with the non-proliferation regime".

IX. In addition, during the period, the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to fully support all other international and regional resolutions and statements in support of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

X. In another measure in support of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, the Islamic Republic of Iran held two international conferences on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in Tehran, on 17 and 18 April 2010 and on 12 and 13 June 2011, which, inter alia, examined the ways and means of realizing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

XI. The Islamic Republic of Iran, including through several rounds of consultations with the facilitator, participated in the preparation process for the conference on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, as decided by the 2010 Review Conference, and in 2012 officially declared its decision to participate in the conference, which, regrettably, was not convened owing only to the refusal of the Israeli regime to participate in the conference.

XII. The Islamic Republic of Iran continued its bilateral and multilateral dialogue and consultations with States parties to the Treaty, particularly in the Middle East, to exchange views and coordinate positions on the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and the 2010 action plan on its implementation.

XIII. The Islamic Republic of Iran also actively participated in the 2015 Review Conference and fully supported the elements on the implementation of the 1995 resolution and the 2010 action plan on the Middle East contained in the draft final document, which was not adopted due to the objection of only

the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Canada.

5. While expressing its deepest concern over the failure of the 2015 Review Conference, due to the objection of the above-mentioned countries to the inclusion in the draft final document of certain elements on the implementation of the 1995 resolution and the 2010 action plan on the Middle East, the Islamic Republic of Iran reiterates its principled position on the subject. The Islamic Republic of Iran will resolutely continue its utmost efforts, including within the United Nations and other multilateral forums, in particular the review process of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

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Implementation of article VI

Report submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran

1. The present report is submitted in accordance with action 20 of the action plan on nuclear disarmament, adopted at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accordingly, it contains the list of measures taken by the Islamic Republic of Iran, since the adoption of that action plan, to implement article VI of the Treaty, paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on the principles and objectives for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and the action plan on nuclear disarmament adopted at the 2010 Review Conference, taking into account the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

2. The Islamic Republic of Iran believes that reporting, as envisaged in actions 5 and 20 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference, is a useful means to assess the status of implementation of obligations assumed under article VI of the Treaty and the unequivocal undertakings committed by the nuclear-weapon States in the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences of the Treaty. At the same time, while the objectivity of such an assessment can, in fact, be best served through the adoption of a unified format that properly defines the categories of required information, this mechanism cannot and shall not substitute for the fulfilment of the obligation for nuclear disarmament under article VI of the Treaty.

3. The Islamic Republic of Iran signed and ratified the Treaty in 1969 and 1970, respectively. In accordance with article III (1) of the Treaty, the Islamic Republic of Iran also concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in June 1973. The ratification of the Treaty before its entry into force and the early conclusion of the safeguards agreement with the Agency by the Islamic Republic of Iran clearly demonstrate its long-standing support for and commitment to the objectives of this instrument.

4. In 1974, the Islamic Republic of Iran presented the idea of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Since then, the proposal has been endorsed annually by the General Assembly in resolutions that have been adopted without a vote since 1982. The Islamic Republic of Iran also signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 1996.

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5. The Islamic Republic of Iran has fulfilled its obligations under all the provisions of the Treaty with the aim of helping its integrity and universality and achieving its fundamental objectives. The policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran to renounce the nuclear option as a matter of principle and to place its peaceful nuclear facilities under the full-scope safeguards of IAEA is a clear manifestation of its commitment to the Treaty. The Islamic Republic of Iran considers the acquisition, development and use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to be inhuman, immoral, illegal and against its very basic principles. Accordingly, nuclear weapons have no place in the defence doctrine of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

6. The Islamic Republic of Iran attaches great importance to the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations under article VI of the Treaty, the fulfilment of which is one of the fundamental objectives of this instrument, which can also greatly contribute to enhancing international peace and security. It is deeply disappointing, however, that the nuclear disarmament obligations under the Treaty, as well as the unequivocal undertakings committed by the nuclear-weapon States in the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences, have remained unfulfilled.

7. As the International Court of Justice stipulated in its advisory opinion of 8 July 1996 on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law, and there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. While emphasizing the importance and validity of this advisory opinion with regard to the obligations of States parties under article VI of the Treaty, the Islamic Republic of Iran calls upon the nuclear-weapon States that have the primary responsibility in this regard to implement their long overdue obligations on nuclear disarmament. The full compliance by the nuclear-weapon States with their nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments is essential for progress in nuclear disarmament.

8. As a party to the Treaty, the Islamic Republic of Iran continues its compliance with the Treaty, including obligations under its article VI. The measures that have been taken, since 2010, by the Islamic Republic of Iran to implement article VI of the Treaty, paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on principles and objectives for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and the 2010 action plan on nuclear disarmament, taking into account the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996, are, among others, as follows:

(a) During the period, the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to actively participate in international efforts to promote nuclear disarmament. Initiatives taken towards this noble goal have always enjoyed the full support of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In this regard, in 2011 and 2013, the Islamic Republic of Iran presented two draft resolutions to the General Assembly on the follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which were adopted as resolutions 66/28, 68/35 and 70/38. By virtue of those resolutions, the Assembly, inter alia, called for all the nuclear-weapon States to take the following practical steps, which would lead to nuclear disarmament:

(i) Further efforts to be made by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally;

(ii) Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI of the Treaty and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress in nuclear disarmament;

(iii) The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process;

(iv) Concrete agreed measures to reduce further the operational status of nuclear weapons systems;

(v) A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies so as to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination;

(vi) The engagement, as soon as appropriate, of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons;

(b) In 2012, the Islamic Republic of Iran, along with the other members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, was one of the sponsors of General Assembly resolution 67/39 on the high-level meeting of the Assembly on nuclear disarmament, by which the Assembly decided, inter alia, to convene a high-level meeting of the Assembly on nuclear disarmament, on 26 September 2013, to contribute to achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament;

(c) In pursuance of its long-standing principled position in support of nuclear disarmament, the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Hassan Rouhani, participated in the first-ever high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament, on 26 September 2013, and presented, on behalf of the 120 States members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, a three-point proposal on nuclear disarmament. The proposal was supported by many of the representatives of political and geographical groups, Member States and civil society participating in that meeting and was subsequently adopted by the Assembly in its resolutions 68/32, 69/58, 70/34 and 71/71 on the follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the Assembly on nuclear disarmament. Through those resolutions, the Assembly:

(i) Called for the urgent commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament for the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction;

(ii) Decided to convene, no later than 2018, a United Nations high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament to review the progress made in that regard;

(iii) Declared 26 September as the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons devoted to furthering that objective, including through enhancing public awareness and education about the threat posed to humanity by nuclear weapons and the necessity for their total elimination, in order to mobilize international efforts towards achieving the common goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world;

(d) In order to promote the cause of nuclear disarmament, the Islamic Republic of Iran held two international conferences on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, which were held in Tehran on 17 and 18 April 2010 and on 12 and 13 June 2011, at which the current challenges to the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments were examined and mechanisms to realize the lofty goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world were sought;

(e) During the period, and along with the other members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to vote in favour of General Assembly resolutions on the follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons;

(f) The Islamic Republic of Iran was among the initiators and cosponsors of the idea of promoting the humanitarian aspects of nuclear weapons and, on the basis of its principled position on the renunciation of nuclear weapons, especially taking into account the religious prohibition of these inhumane weapons, actively participated in the three Conferences on the Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear Weapons, held in Oslo in 2013, in Nayarit, Mexico, in February 2014, and in Vienna in December 2014;

(g) During the period, the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to actively participate in annual substantive sessions of the Disarmament Commission and fully supported its agenda item on recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons;

(h) Likewise, during the period, the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to actively participate in the work of the Conference on Disarmament. The Islamic Republic of Iran strongly believes that the Conference, as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body, should uphold its credibility and maintain its relevancy to international peace and security despite its current difficulties. To that end, during its presidency of the Conference in 2013, the main focus of the Islamic Republic of Iran was to reach an agreement on a comprehensive and balanced programme of work. To that end, the Islamic Republic of Iran undertook its utmost efforts to consult almost all the members of the Conference. Accordingly, the common denominator of all positions was reflected in document CD/1952 as a proposal of the Islamic Republic of Iran for the programme of work of that year of the Conference;

(i) Moreover, the Islamic Republic of Iran has contributed to the work of Conference on Disarmament, in particular its agenda item on nuclear disarmament, including through its active participation in preparing and submitting the working paper of the Group of 21 on nuclear disarmament in 2010 and subsequent years;

(j) During the period, the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to fully support all international and regional efforts towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Likewise, the Islamic Republic of Iran maintained its principled position to vote in favour of all resolutions on the establishment of such a zone, including in the General Assembly, the General Conference of IAEA and the summits and ministerial conferences of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. In this context, the Islamic Republic of Iran, including through several rounds of consultations with the Facilitator, participated in the preparation process for the conference on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, as decided by the 2010 Review Conference and, in 2012, officially declared its decision to participate therein, which, regrettably, was not convened owing only to the refusal of the Israeli regime to participate in that Conference;

(k) The Islamic Republic of Iran also actively participated in the 2015 Review Conference and the meetings of its Preparatory Committee in 2012, 2013 and 2014, and submitted four reports on the implementation of article VI of the Treaty, paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on principles and objectives for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and the action plan on nuclear disarmament adopted at the 2010 Review Conference. The Islamic Republic of Iran also submitted four working papers on nuclear disarmament to those meetings;

(l) The Islamic Republic of Iran also actively participated in the meetings of the open-ended working group to develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons in 2013 and 2016. In addition to making several proposals

during the meetings of the working groups, the Islamic Republic of Iran submitted two working papers on taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations;

(m) The Islamic Republic of Iran participated and made statements at all meetings of the General Assembly, convened in 2014, 2015 and 2016, on the occasion of the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons;

(n) During the period, the Islamic Republic of Iran conducted several rounds of bilateral dialogue, on promoting the implementation of treaties banning weapons of mass destruction, with some nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, in which particular importance was attached to nuclear disarmament and the need for intensive international efforts towards the early realization of a nuclear-weapon-free world.